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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This multi-issue appeal has its origin in the sale of a 
company subject to an apparently simple "right of first 
offer." Cristen Gleason ("Gleason") founded U.S. 
Recognition, Inc. ("USR" or "Company") to develop and sell 
computer systems and software to search, store, and 
retrieve real estate listing infor mation. In October 1991, 
Gleason agreed to sell all of his capital stock in USR to the 
defendant, Norwest Mortgage, Inc. ("Norwest"), a national 
mortgage banking company. The sale contract pr ovided that 
if Norwest decided to sell USR within the firstfive years 
after the closing date of this sale, it was obligedfirst to offer 
it to Gleason. If Gleason did not accept the of fer within 
thirty days, Norwest was free to sell USR to another buyer 
on terms substantially similar to those of fered to Gleason. 
 
Norwest sold USR to Moore Business Forms, Inc. 
("Moore") in 1996. Gleason claims that Norwest neither 
made him the first offer to buy USR nor sold USR at terms 
substantially similar to those offered to and accepted by 
Moore. Gleason moved in a New Jersey state court for a 
preliminary injunction to restrain Norwest from proceeding 
with the sale. Norwest removed the action to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where 
the Court, on October 10, 1996, denied the motion for the 
injunction. The District Court later granted summary 
judgment for Norwest and against Gleason. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part and remand for further 
proceedings as are consistent with this opinion. 
 




Gleason founded USR in 1984 to develop and sell 
computer systems and software to store, search, and 
retrieve real estate listing infor mation. On October 25, 
1991, Gleason agreed to sell all of the capital stock in the 
Company to Norwest for $1.3 million. Gleason r emained as 
President of USR. The stock purchase agr eement ("SPA") 
included provisions requiring Norwest to maintain USR as 
a separate profit center for at least five years. Particularly 
pertinent to this appeal, S 9.2 of the SP A specifically 
provided: 
 
       [Norwest] agrees that if it decides to sell USR at any 
       time during the first five years after the Closing Date, 
       it will first offer USR to [Mr. Gleason]. [Mr. Gleason] 
       shall have 30 days to accept the offer , and if not 
       accepted within the 30 days, [Norwest] shall be free to 
       sell USR to anyone else on terms substantially similar 
       to those offered to [Mr. Gleason]. 
 
In early 1993, Norwest acquired Boris Systems, Inc. 
("Boris"), USR's former competitor . As early as September 
1995, Norwest began investigating the sale of Boris and 
USR as a package. Norwest created an "Of fering 
Memorandum" and other internal and exter nal documents 
expressing an interest to solicit of fers for its USR and Boris 
subsidiaries. By early 1996, after preliminary discussions 
with several potential buyers, Norwest's discussions began 
with Moore. Commencing in May 1996 and thr ough June 
and July 1996, the negotiations between Norwest and 
Moore progressed and intensified. On May 15, 1996, Moore 
wrote Norwest that it "received corporate approval to 
proceed with . . . negotiations which will hopefully result in 
Moore's acquisition of Boris and [USR]." Moore also 
proposed a price of $11.5 million for both companies and a 
general outline of a process to "maximize the certainty of 
closing," including a confidentiality agr eement. Id. 
 
On June 11, 1996, Norwest responded thr ough its 
investment bank to Moore's proposal, stating it wanted to 
move toward a definitive agreement with Moore, and would 
be prepared to cease temporarily pr eparation of a formal 
auction for Boris and USR if Moore accepted Norwest's 
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counter-proposal terms, viz: 1) $15 million purchase price; 
2) Norwest receives participation rights for two years on any 
initiatives relating to the origination offirst mortgage loans 
through any product offerings by Moore; 3) Moore 
completes its preliminary due diligence pr ocess during any 
two consecutive day period within nine days of June 11, to 
be performed off USR's premises; 4) Moore enters a 
definitive agreement with Norwest by June 28, 1996; 5) 
Moore must not disclose the possible sale of Boris or USR 
during due diligence; and 6) Moore pays a $1.5 million 
break-up fee if it fails to close the transaction. On June 26, 
1996, Moore wrote Norwest stating it r eceived corporate 
approval to proceed with negotiations for the acquisition of 
Boris and USR, and was making a "non-binding pr oposal" 
to pay $13.5 million. Moore also proposed other pre- and 
post-closing procedures. 
 
Gleason first learned about Moore's interest in USR and 
Boris on June 26, 1996, when Norwest Executive V ice 
President Mike Keller ("Keller") invited Gleason to dinner 
and told him that Norwest wanted $14 million for Boris and 
USR, that Norwest expected to sign an agreement with 
Moore within a few days, and that the $14 million price was 
allocated $12 million for Boris and $2 million for USR. 
Gleason stated that he wanted to buy both companies; 
Keller was noncommittal. 
 
On July 3, 1996, Moore wrote to Norwest stating that: 1) 
Moore received corporate approval to proceed with 
negotiations which hopefully would result in Moore's 
acquisition of Boris and USR; 2) it would pay $14 million 
for USR and Boris; 3) it required certain procedures during 
the pre-closing due diligence process; and 4) the letter was 
a "non-binding proposal for how Moor e . . . would acquire 
Boris and [USR]." Norwest responded on July 8, 1996 
stating that the proposed terms wer e acceptable, and that 
it had assigned resources to assist Moor e's pre-diligence 
process. Moore later produced, at Norwest's request, a 
"Valuation Estimate Split" attributing $3.5 million of the 
proposed $14 million purchase price to USR. 
 
On July 19, 1996, Norwest formally offer ed to sell USR's 
stock to Gleason for $3.5 million, subject to the following 
terms: 1) Norwest would have a right to participate in any 
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initiatives for mortgage-related transactional services and 
products offered by USR; 2) a definitive agreement of sale 
must be entered within thirty days, and Gleason would 
have to place a "break-up" fee into escr ow upon execution; 
3) Norwest would provide transitional accounting and 
human resources services for the balance of 1996 at no 
charge; 4) Gleason would have thirty days to accept the 
offer by formal execution of a mutually agreeable definitive 
stock purchase agreement and by pr oviding evidence that 
financing acceptable to Norwest was in place; 5) if Gleason 
accepted the offer, the purchase must close within 15 days 
from the date of execution of the definitive agreement; and 
6) the due diligence process was limited to no more than 
three days, and must be performed off-site from USR's 
operations. 
 
Gleason wrote to Norwest on August 14 stating, inter 
alia, that: 1) he was interested in acquiring USR and Boris; 
2) negotiations with financing sources wer e "encouraging;" 
3) the terms Norwest offered wer e unlikely to be met in the 
time frame proposed; 4) if the price for USR changed, he 
was entitled to another opportunity to purchase USR; 5) he 
had questions about how a Norwest software package called 
"Win-2" would be administered after USR's sale;1 and 6) he 
would be interested in a leveraged buyout if negotiations 
with Moore became difficult. 
 
By August 19, 1996, the day after Norwest's of fer to 
Gleason expired, the price for Boris and USR of fered by 
Moore had fallen to $13.5 million. Gleason, by letter dated 
August 19, 1996, offered Norwest $3.5 million for USR 
pending clarification of the Win-2 softwar e asset. In that 
letter, Gleason, explaining that he r etained an investment 
bank (Alex. Brown) to assist in obtaining financing, also 
offered $13.5 million for USR and Boris. Gleason also asked 
for more time to negotiate and close a deal. On August 19, 
Alex. Brown wrote to Norwest requesting: 1) confirmation of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. WIN-2 was a product developed jointly by Boris and USR during 
Norwest's ownership. WIN-2 was expensive and fraught with technical 
delays and problems. Its ownership was a factor in talks to sell USR and 
Boris, especially when sale of the two companies to different buyers was 
contemplated. 
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the offering price and terms for Boris and USR; and 2) a 
sample definitive agreement. Norwest did not respond to 
either the August 19 letters from Gleason and Alex. Brown 
or the August 14 letter from Gleason. Norwest, however, 
worked toward executing binding agreements with Moore. 
 
On September 6, 1996, Gleason, moving for a pr eliminary 
injunction restraining Norwest from selling USR and Boris, 
brought a civil action against Norwest in the Superior Court 
of New Jersey, Passaic County. Norwest removed the action 
to the United States District Court, and successfully 
opposed the preliminary injunction. On September 24, 
1996, in anticipation of the impending sale of USR and 
Boris, Norwest caused Boris and USR to execute a cr oss- 
licensing agreement confirming that both USR and Boris 
had full ownership of WIN-2. On September 27, 1996, 
Norwest and Moore signed two stock purchase agreements, 
one for Boris and one for USR, but the parties did not close 
on the transactions. Moore agreed to pay $3.5 million for 
USR. 
 
Apparently out of a sense of caution, on September 27, 
1996, Norwest again offered to sell USR to Gleason. 
Norwest stated that it believed Gleason's S 9.2 right had 
expired unexercised in August, but that a second 
opportunity would address Gleason's claim that Norwest 
did not provide him a "meaningful opportunity to exercise" 
his option. Norwest enclosed a cross-license agreement for 
WIN-2 (in response to Gleason's query in his August 14, 
1996 letter), and a proposed agreement with related 
schedules. See id. The relevant ter ms of the offer included: 
1) Gleason had thirty days to accept; 2) $3.5 million 
purchase price in cash at closing; 3) closing and execution 
of an agreement must be completed by 10:00 a.m. on 
October 28, 1996; and 4) Gleason could perfor m the due 
diligence process at any time, subject to a confidentiality 
agreement, off-site from USR's locations. 
 
Moore closed on its purchase of Boris on October 1, 
1996. As part of that sale, Moore and Norwest executed a 
non-competition agreement in which Norwest agr eed not to 
compete with Boris for five years after closing, and in which 
Moore allowed Norwest to operate USR in competition with 
Boris until USR was sold. Moore closed on its purchase of 
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USR on November 1, 1996 after Gleason failed to comply 
with the acceptance terms in the September 27, 1996 offer. 
 
In February 1997, Norwest moved for summary judgment 
on Gleason's first amended complaint claims of, inter alia, 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Also in February 1997, the 
District Court granted Gleason leave to file a second 
amended complaint adding fraud claims. In May 1997, 
Norwest moved for summary judgment on the fraud claims. 
On September 17, 1997, the District Court granted 
summary judgment against Gleason's breach of contract 
and fraud claims. On October 2, 1997, Gleason moved for 
reconsideration based on new evidence, including expert 
witness testimony developed since March 1997. The District 
Judge denied the motion to reconsider. On October 15, 
1997, Norwest requested that the Court clarify whether it 
intended to enter summary judgment against the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. On October 





Before turning to the merits, we must consider, as a 
threshold matter, our appellate jurisdiction. On January 
28, 2000, the parties stipulated to a "final judgment" order 
under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b).2 The District Judge stated 
that all claims were resolved through judgment, settlement, 
or mootness, except that each party's claim for contractual 
attorneys' fees and costs under SPAS 8.11 remained 
outstanding.3 The judge found"no reason for delay in entry 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b) states in r elevant part: 
 
       When more than one claim for relief is pr esented in an action . . 
. 
       the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more 
       but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
       determination that there is no just r eason for delay and upon an 
       express direction for the entry of judgment. . . . 
 
3. SPA S 8.11 provides: 
 
       If any party to this Agreement brings an action or suit against any 
       other party be [sic] reason of any br each of any covenant, 
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of this final judgment" and explicitly labeled the order a 
final judgment. The judge further stated that the outcome 
of appeals could materially affect the Court's determination 
of which party prevailed and which party lost. When this 
Court docketed the appeal, the Clerk warned counsel that 
dismissal was possible for an unspecified jurisdictional 
defect. Norwest, without conceding that ther e was appellate 
jurisdiction, responded that "a number of cases . . . have 
discussed the award of counsel fees in a br each of contract 
case and the finality of an appeal before such an award is 
made." Gleason responded that the January 28 order of the 
District Court was "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 (final order statute), so that we had jurisdiction to 
decide the appeal. 
 
Gleason, citing the January 28, 1999 "final judgment" 
order and Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 
196, 202-03 (1988), argues that there is appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Norwest questions 
whether there is appellate jurisdiction because the 
attorneys' fee issue turns on a pr ovision in the same 
contract containing the right of first offer provision. Even 
though Norwest does not explicitly argue that there is no 
appellate jurisdiction, we must under the cir cumstances 
consider our own jurisdiction before reviewing the merits. 
See Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
657 F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
When an outstanding claim for attorneys' fees is by a 
statutory prevailing party, the unresolved issue of those 
fees does not prevent judgment on the merits fr om being 
final. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202. However, we have held 
that when attorneys' fees are part of the contractual 
damages at issue on the merits, a District Court's order 
delaying quantifying the amount of such fees is non-final 
for purposes of appeal. See Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       agreement, representation, warranty or any other provision hereof, 
       or any breach of any duty or obligation cr eated hereunder by such 
       other party, the prevailing party in whose favor final judgment is 
       entered shall be entitled to have and r ecover of and from the 
losing 
       party, all costs and expenses incurred or sustained by such 
       prevailing party in connection with such suit or action, including 
       without limitation, reasonable legal fees and court costs . . . . 
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Inc., 62 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1995). "[W]hen an award of 
attorney fees is based on a contractual pr ovision and is an 
`integral part of the contractual relief sought,' the order 
does not become final and appealable until the attorney 
fees are quantified." Id. Ra gan distinguished claims for 
attorneys' fees by prevailing parties under statute from 
claims for attorneys' fees as damages. See Vargas v. 
Hudson County Bd. of Elec., 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing distinction in treatment under S 1291 between 
fees as an element of damages and fees for a statutory 
prevailing party). In this case, the claim for attorney's fees 
is not predicated on a statutory prevailing party provision 
but on the contractual obligation to pay attor neys' fees "to 
the prevailing party in whose favor judgment is entered." 
SPA S 8.11. For all practical purposes, we see no difference 
under these circumstances, for S 1291finality purposes, 
between payment of attorneys' fees to a pr evailing party 
under statute and payment of attorneys' fees under the 
contract to a "prevailing party." The pr evailing party 
attorneys' fees provided for in SP A S 8.11 are not an 
integral part of the contractual relief sought; the issue of 
which party prevailed in the litigation on the merits is 
collateral to the substantive issues on appeal and does not 
prevent judgment on the merits from beingfinal. 
 
The Rule 54(b) "final judgment" was final for purposes of 
appeal of the substantive determinations. Thus, we have 
appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Gleason and 
Norwest are citizens of different states, and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000; subject matter jurisdiction 




Gleason appeals the summary judgment against his 
breach of express contract, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and fraud claims. W e exercise 
plenary review of a grant of summary judgment, applying 
the same standard as the District Court. See Kiewit Eastern 
Co., Inc. v. L & R Constr. Co., 44 F .3d 1194, 1198 (3d Cir. 
1995). The Court may grant summary judgment only if, 
after drawing all reasonable inferences fr om the underlying 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
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there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. In 
determining whether the District Court err ed, we must view 
the facts as asserted by the nonmoving party as true if they 
are supported by affidavits or other admissible evidentiary 
material. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. W olckenhauer, 215 
F.3d 340, 343 (3d Cir. 2000); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental 
Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir . 1996). A nonmoving 
party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has 
provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its 
favor at trial. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 
72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is 
appropriate for the moving party if no r easonable juror 
could conclude that the non-moving party should pr evail. 
See Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F .3d 480, 482 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
In this case, the SPA states that it "shall in all respects 
be governed by, and enforced and interpr eted in accordance 
with, the laws of the State of Minnesota." See SPA S 8.14. 
We perceive no error in the District Court's determination 
that Minnesota law applies to the breach of contract and 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claims. The 
District Court also appropriately applied New Jersey law to 
the fraud claim because there is no significant distinction 
between the substantive laws of fraud among the interested 
states of New Jersey, Iowa, and Minnesota. Neither party 
contests the District Court's choice of law decisions. 
 
A. Breach of S 9.2 of 1991 SP A 
 
The objective of judicial interpretation of disputed 
contract provisions is to give effect to the discernable 
intention of the parties, ascertaining that intent, if possible, 
by examining the contractual plain language. See Midway 
Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 
1975). A contract is unambiguous if the Court, without 
looking to extrinsic evidence, can determine the meaning of 
the contract's language. See ICC Leasing Corp. v. 
Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 1977). 
The determination of whether a contract ter m is clear or 
ambiguous is a question of law. See Goebel v. North 
Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1997). A 
contract is ambiguous if, based on its language alone, it is 
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reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. See 
id. Whether a contract is ambiguous depends on the 
meaning assigned to words or phrases in accor dance with 
the apparent purpose of the contract as a whole. See id. 
 
S 9.2 of the SPA states: 
 
       Right of First Refusal to Repurchase. 
 
       [Norwest] agrees that if it decides to sell USR at any 
       time during the first five years after the Closing Date, 
       it will first offer USR to [Mr. Gleason]. [Mr. Gleason] 
       shall have 30 days to accept the offer , and if not 
       accepted within the 30 days, [Norwest] shall be free to 
       sell USR to anyone else on terms substantially similar 
       to those offered to [Mr. Gleason]. 
 
The threshold question is a determination of the extent of 
the legal right provided by S 9.2 to Gleason for the 
repurchase of USR. Gleason and Norwest contest whether 
S 9.2 provides a "right of first of fer" or a "right of first 
refusal." This is a question of law, the answer to which lays 
the groundwork for every issue on appeal. 
 
Were we to consider the substantive language of S 9.2 as 
giving Gleason the right of "first offer" to purchase, as he 
argues on appeal here, we would declar e the provision void 
for vagueness. No price for the property isfixed in S 9.2, nor 
are any terms or conditions of sale. Nor does S 9.2 set a 
method for ascertaining a sale price. See Portnoy v. Brown, 
243 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1968) ("[P]rice is an essential 
ingredient of every contract for the transfer of property and 
must be sufficiently definite and certain or capable of being 
ascertained from the contract between the parties."); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 33(1), (3) (1981); see 
also I Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts S 4.18 (1999). 
On the other hand, if S 9.2 is construed, as we think the 
parties truly intended at the time the instrument was 
executed, as a right of first refusal,4 then the price and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Gleason's pleadings, early affidavits, and pre-litigation 
correspondence 
consistently refer to S 9.2 as a right offirst refusal, and support our 
construction of this section. Gleason intended to possess a right of first 
refusal, not a right to first offer . His altered position, presumably 
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terms are determined by refer ence to the same terms 
offered by a bona fide third-party purchaser. Thus, a right 
of first refusal, also known as a preemptive right, empowers 
Gleason with a preferential right to r epurchase USR on the 
same terms offered by a bona fide purchaser. In the 
absence of such a construction, this naked right of"first 
offer" can have no legal significance or preemptive right 
whatsoever. Without a price, ter ms, or conditions, a right of 
first refusal creates a dormant right of preemption, the 
right to receive an offer before others do, but based on third 
party information. The right cannot be exer cised until 
receipt of a bona fide third party of fer. Once the holder of 
a right of first refusal receives notice of a third party's offer 
with price and terms, the right of first r efusal is 
transformed into an option. See 17 C.J.S. S 56 (1999).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
precipitated by his new counsel on appeal, does not change the clear 
intent of the parties when the contract was for med and when Gleason 
attempted to exercise the provision. See Appx. 1665 (Gleason's affidavit 
in opposition to motion for summary judgment stating, "When I 
negotiated the sale of USR to Norwest which closed on May 1, 1992, I 
had at least three major objectives: (a) to take back a Right of First 
Refusal to repurchase USR if Norwest ever decided to sell it; . . . ." See 
Appx. 287, 295 (Gleason's Amended and Supplemental Complaint, twice 
alleging violation of his "Right of First Refusal," and never mentioning 
any right of first offer). See also Appx. 17, 19, 20, 28, 31, 46, 1356. 
 
5. We do not hold that a right of first offer is not recognized under the 
law as distinct from a right of first refusal. A right to receive a first 
offer 
may exist if the contract provides price and other relevant terms, or a 
means of ascertaining them. But a bald "right offirst offer," as exists 
here, is meaningless and void unless the parties intended to create a 
right of first refusal. Contractual language providing for a first offer 
to 
sell in reality may be read "as a rightof first refusal." Lind v. Vanguard 
Offset Printers, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Lind also 
involved the purchase of stock with an agr eement on the part of the 
purchaser that if he decided to sell his stock,"he must first offer it 
back 
to [the seller]." Id. "A right of first refusal, also known as a 
preemption 
or preemption right, requires the seller, when or if he or she decides to 
sell, to first offer the property to the holder of the right, either at a 
stipulated price or at the price and on the ter ms the seller is willing 
to 
sell." Allison v. Agribank FCB, 949 S.W . 2d 182, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
Minnesota law is in accord. See Henry Simons Lumber Co. v. Simons, 44 
N.W.2d 726, 727 (Minn. 1950). Accor d, Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 
185 (R.I. 1984). 
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Under the basic rule of contract construction, we 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the agreement. To this end, we construe the 
contract as a whole, giving effect to every portion of the 
instrument, if possible, and utilizing that construction 
rendering the agreement legal rather than one which makes 
it void." See 11 Richard A. Lor d, Williston on Contracts 
S 32:11 (1999). Consistent with our construction of S 9.2, 
the caption of the section identifying Gleason's right to 
repurchase states, "Right of First Refusal." We are mindful, 
however, of language in the SPA r emoving legal effect to 
captions. See SPA S 8.7. 
 
Thus, giving Gleason as the non-moving party and the 
subject of the provisions of S 9.2 the benefit of all 
inferences, we conclude that S 9.2 of the SPA gave Gleason 
not a right to notice of a decision by Norwest to sell, but 
under the facts of this case, a preemptive"right of first 
refusal," effective upon Norwest's r eceipt of a bona fide 
third party offer. We now turn to whether Norwest complied 
with Gleason's preemptive right. 
 
The District Court held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact and that Norwest: acted consistently 
with the clear and unambiguous terms of the SP A when it 
negotiated with Moore; made the first of fer of sale to 
Gleason and waited thirty days for Gleason to r espond to 
the offer; and sold to Moore after thirty days at 
substantially similar terms. 
 
Gleason argues on appeal that five disputed issues of 
material fact remain: 1) whether Norwest decided to sell 
before it offered USR to Gleason, thus purportedly 
breaching the SPA; 2) once it decided to sell USR, whether 
Norwest first offered USR to Gleason; 3) whether the non- 
financial terms offered to Moor e were substantially similar 
to those offered to and rejected by Gleason; 4) whether the 
$3.5 million price offered to Gleason was substantially 
similar to the price Moore paid; and 5) whether Gleason 
suffered any loss, detriment, or injury. 
 
       1. Norwest's Decision to Sell 
 
The parties contest when Norwest decided to sell USR, 
but this is not a material fact. Gleason argues that as soon 
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as Norwest decided to sell USR, Norwest was r equired 
immediately to make an offer to Gleason underS 9.2. But 
S 9.2 does not require such action. The date Norwest 
decided to sell is only relevant to whether it was "during the 
first five years after the closing date" of Gleason's sale to 
Norwest. The parties agree that Norwest decided to sell USR 
during the five year period; that ends the inquiry. The 
timing of the sale, whether determined by tax, marketing or 
other considerations, remained at all times within Norwest's 
control so long as it first gave Gleason an opportunity to 
purchase USR on substantially similar ter ms as those 
appearing in Moore's bona fide offer . To the extent that the 
District Court found or implied that Norwest decided to sell 
on any given date, that finding or that implication is 
irrelevant. The "Offering Memorandum" that Norwest 
produced in 1995 was an invitation to negotiate; it was not 
a legal offer for sale. Gleason attempts to construct a 
disputed issue of material fact, when the language of S 9.2 
can only be reasonably read to create a right of first refusal, 
especially on the facts of this case. 
 
       2. Whether Norwest first offered USR to Gleason 
 
Gleason argues strenuously that once Norwest decided to 
sell USR, Norwest was required to communicate with 
Gleason first and that Norwest's overtures to third parties 
like Moore breached S 9.2. 
 
Section 9.2 gives Gleason the right of first r efusal, not a 
right to first negotiation. As we construe S 9.2, the word 
"first" in the phrase "first offer" means only that Gleason 
was to have been given the opportunity to exer cise his right 
of first refusal. Norwest could have valued USR strictly with 
accounting information, but nothing in S 9.2 prevented 
Norwest from ascertaining USR's value by exploring the 
marketplace and soliciting offers to pur chase. "Frequently, 
negotiations for a contract are begun between parties by 
general expressions of willingness to enter into a bargain 
upon stated terms, and yet the natural construction of the 
words and conduct of the parties is that they are inviting 
offers, or suggesting the terms of a possible future bargain, 
rather than making positive offers." 1 Richard A. Cord, 
Williston on Contracts S 4:7 (4th ed. 1999). 
 
                                14 
  
On July 19, 1996, Norwest offered to sell USR to 
Gleason, thus providing him with the opportunity to 
exercise his right of first refusal. Until then, Norwest had 
not sold USR to Moore or anyone. Therefor e, any prior 
negotiations, communications, or conversations with regard 
to the sale of USR to Moore or anyone else ar e irrelevant 
and any factual disputes as to those matters ar e not 
material. 
 
       3. Substantial similarity 
 
Section 9.2 permitted Norwest to sell USR to a third 
party only if Norwest first offered it to Gleason on terms 
substantially similar to those offered by the third party. 
Gleason argues that Norwest breachedS 9.2 by selling USR 
to Moore on terms more favorable than those offered to 
Gleason. 
 
       a. Non-financial terms 
 
Generally, a determination of substantial similarity would 
be a jury issue, but the non-price terms that Norwest 
offered to Moore and Gleason wer e so close that no 
reasonable jury could find that they wer e not substantially 
similar. The July 19, 1996 offer to Gleason required that: 1) 
Norwest would have a right to participate in any initiatives 
for mortgage-related transactional services and products 
offered by USR; 2) a definitive agr eement of sale must be 
entered, and Gleason would have to pay a "br eak-up" fee 
into escrow upon execution; 3) Norwest would pr ovide 
transitional accounting and human resour ces services for 
the balance of 1996 at no charge; 4) Gleason would have 
thirty days to accept the offer by for mal execution of a 
mutually agreeable definitive stock pur chase agreement 
and by providing evidence that financing acceptable to 
Norwest was in place; 5) if Gleason accepted the of fer, the 
purchase must close within fifteen days fr om the date of 
execution of the definitive agreement; and 6) due diligence 
was limited to no more than three days, and had to be 
performed off site from USR's operations. Gleason argues 
that Norwest gave Moore: 1) an indefinite period to conduct 
on-site due diligence; 2) no deadline for execution of a stock 
purchase agreement; 3) no obligation to pay a "break-up" 
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fee; 4) an "out" in the event Moore was unable to conclude 
employment agreements for key individuals; and 5) a non- 
competition agreement. See Appellant Reply Br. 16-17. 
Gleason's five objections concern "pr e-closing" terms of 
USR's sale to Moore. 
 
The District Court reasoned that the longer deadlines for 
Moore did not amount to a breach becauseS 9.2 provides 
only thirty days to Gleason to accept the of fer. The 
restrictive pre-closing terms did appear to hamper 
Gleason's ability to accept Norwest's two of fers, but Gleason 
only bargained for thirty days to accept the offer. The 
District Court did not specifically discuss the stress 
between the thirty-day provision in S 9.2 and the longer 
term given to Moore. 
 
Substantial similarity is not lacking among the non- 
financial terms. Independent review of Norwest's two offers 
to Gleason and the final terms of sale to Moore shows that 
they were substantially similar. A br eak-up fee appears to 
have been contemplated between Norwest and Moor e as 
early as June 1996. See June 11, 1996 letter from Norwest 
by UBS Securities, to Moore. Moore had mor e time for due 
diligence because SPA S 9.2 allowed Norwest to limit 
Gleason's due diligence to thirty days. Gleason had been 
President of USR through August 1996, and presumably 
was familiar with its operations and needed far less time 
and access to USR's financial statements than Moor e did. 
The non-competition agreement between Norwest and 
Moore was entered after Gleason's first offer expired, and 
thus cannot be fairly used against Norwest as an additional 
term of sale. 
 
       b. Price terms 
 
The most significant term of the offer to sell concerned 
the price for USR. If the price offered to Gleason was 
artificially excessive, this would in all pr obability discourage 
Gleason's efforts to purchase and would promote Norwest's 
persistent plan to conclude successfully the package sale of 
both USR and Boris to Moore. Gleason ar gues that 
Norwest's $3.5 million price offer was generated improperly 
because it was an arbitrary proration of Moor e's combined 
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valuation of USR and Boris. He argues that Moore and 
Norwest "padded" USR's price and understated Boris's price 
to obstruct Gleason from acquiring USR and to allow 
Norwest to "package sell" its two subsidiaries. Gleason 
argues that Moore actually paid less than $3.5 million for 
USR, and paid more than $9.5 million for Boris, resulting 
in a purchase at terms substantially dif ferent from those 
offered to Gleason. Gleason produced documentary and 
expert evidence that: 1) Moore had valued Boris at $10.5 
million in July 1996, and reduced its value by $1 million by 
September 27, 1996; and 2) the $3.5 million price was 
"generated by adding $836,000 of additional and 
undocumented `synergies.' " Appx. 2905 (expert report of 
Winston Himsworth). Norwest responds that Gleason never 
raised his "padded pricing" argument before the District 
Court, and that he cannot raise it now for the first time. 
 
The ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to be 
made on the record the parties have actually presented, not 
on one potentially possible. See Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 
F.2d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1953). Generally, barring exceptional 
circumstances, like an intervening change in the law or the 
lack of representation by an attor ney, this Court does not 
review issues raised for the first time at the appellate level. 
See Gardiner v. Virgin Islands W ater & Power Auth., 145 
F.3d 635, 646 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United Parcel Serv. v. 
Intern. Broth. Local No. 430, 55 F .3d 138, 140 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1995)). Although we have discretion to r eview an argument 
not raised in the trial Court, we ordinarily r efuse to do so. 
 
Gleason argues that his submissions between the close of 
discovery and the District Court's ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment contained support for the "padding" 
argument, and should have been consider ed in response to 
the motion for summary judgment. Gleason also suggests 
that the District Court should have inferred or implied the 
padding argument because of the severe risk of price 
manipulation in a package deal where part of the package 
is subject to a right of refusal. 
 
On August 29, 1997, nearly a month before the Judge 
made his first ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, Gleason submitted the declaration of W inston E. 
Himsworth ("Himsworth") in support of an expert report 
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concerning USR's proper valuation. In his declaration, 
Himsworth concluded that a proportionate price for USR 
could have been no more than $2.6 million, far less than 
the $3.5 million Norwest offered Gleason. Some courts have 
held that "allocations of price to elements of a package may 
readily be manipulated to defeat contractual rights of first 
refusal." See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enters., Inc. v. Stop & Shop 
Co., 806 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir . 1986); see also 
Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928 (Idaho 1982) (collecting 
cases); Hinson v. Roberts, 349 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. 1986). 
Although the cited cases concern primarily sales of real 
property and are factually distinguishable from this case, 
they establish the principle that we find contr olling: 
allocations of price by interested parties to elements of a 
package may readily be manipulated to defeat contractual 
rights to substantially similar price terms. In deciding the 
motions for summary judgment, the District Court should 
have scrutinized carefully the financial evidence the parties 
produced. Himsworth's report, combined with the strong 
inherent potential for price padding between Norwest and 
Moore, as exacerbated by Norwest's reliance on an 
appraisal by a prospective purchaser , placed the padding 
issue before the District Court. 
 
The evidence in the record presents a dispute of material 
fact concerning whether Norwest and Moor e padded USR's 
price and valuation. Accordingly, we will r emand for 
hearing and fact finding on the price terms as they relate 
to substantial similarity. On remand, the District Court 
must consider loss, detriment, or injury if Gleason proves 
that there was this breach of the SP A. His damages, if any, 
will be a question of fact for the jury. 
 
B. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing  
 
The District Court dismissed this claim, reasoning that 
Minnesota does not recognize a separate or independent 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
 
In Minnesota, "every contract includes an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In re Hennepin 
County 1986 Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W .2d 494, 502 
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(Minn. 1995) (requiring that one party not unjustifiably 
hinder other party's performance of contract);6 Sterling 
Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Herzog, 575 N.W . 2d 121, 125 
(Minn. App. 1998). One who frustrates the satisfaction of a 
condition precedent cannot take advantage of that failure. 
See Tolzman v. Town of Wyoming , No. C1-98-1533, 1999 
WL 109604 (Minn. App. 1999). "Bad faith" is defined as a 
party's refusal to fulfill some duty or contractual obligation 
based on an ulterior motive, not an honest mistake 
regarding one's rights or duties. See Lassen v. First Bank 
Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. App. 1994). 
 
If a jury finds that the price terms wer e not substantially 
similar, it could also reasonably find that Norwest hindered 
Gleason's performance under SPAS 9.2. As discussed 
above, package pricing provides immense power to 
manipulate the terms of the proposed transaction and to 
bloat the offering price for the USR segment to Gleason. 
Norwest may have abused its power. 
 
Norwest argues again that Gleason did not pr eserve this 
issue for appeal because he failed to raise the ar gument in 
the District Court. However, Gleason's opposition to 
Norwest's motion for summary judgment states "[f]or the 
reasons set forth above with respect to Norwest's conduct 
in breaching SS 9.1 and 9.2 of the SP A, as well as its 
attempt to cheat Gleason on his Employment Agr eement, 
significant material factual issues are pr esented with 
respect to [the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
claim]." But the District Court did not consider any of 
Gleason's claims under the implied warranty because of its 
errant conclusion that Minnesota law does not r ecognize 
such a cause of action. The District Court should be in a 




The District Court held that Norwest made no material 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Hennepin County appears to have implicitly overruled the holding in 
Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W. 2d 775, 790 (Minn. 1976), that a claim for 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing will not be recognized under Minnesota law if both claims 
arise from the same conduct. 
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misrepresentations to Gleason, and that Gleason suffered 
no damages because he received all to which he was 
entitled under the SPA. Gleason argues he suffered 
damages from fraud because: 1) Norwest did not offer USR 
to him in December 1995 when it began soliciting bids; 2) 
Keller knowingly and intentionally lied in r esponse to 
Gleason's inquiries about whether Boris and USR wer e for 
sale; and 3) Norwest's alleged intentional material 
misrepresentations had an adverse ef fect on Gleason's 
ability to finance an acquisition of USR. 
 
Keller and Norwest had no duty to disclose to Gleason 
that Norwest was negotiating to divest USR and Boris. 
Norwest's duty under the SPA was limited to of fering USR 
to Gleason before selling it to someone else at substantially 
similar terms. Norwest argues that it discharged all of its 
duties to Gleason by making its two offers, and that 
regardless, New Jersey law does not r ecognize tort and 
contract claims based on the same underlying facts. We 
disagree for reasons set forth below. 
 
       1. Concurrent Fraud and Contract Claims  
 
No New Jersey Supreme Court case holds that a fraud 
claim cannot be maintained if based on the same 
underlying facts as a contract claim. More than ten years 
ago, we stated that: 
 
       The question of the continuing validity of fraud claims 
       in cases involving frustrated economic expectations 
       under New Jersey law is very complex and 
       troublesome. The United States District Court for New 
       Jersey unequivocally has held that the New Jersey 
       Supreme Court's reasoning in Spring Motors 
       Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 
       A.2d 660 (1985), though not explicitly addressing fraud 
       claims, "leads . . . to the conclusion that, as between 
       commercial parties New Jersey will not countenance" 
       claims for fraud other than fraud in the inducement. 
       Unifoil Corp., 622 F. Supp. at 270-71. Spring Motors 
       held that "as among commercial parties . . . contract 
       law, . . . provides the more appropriate system [as 
       compared to tort law] for adjudicating disputes arising 
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       from frustrated economic expectations." 489 A.2d at 
       673. 
 
       Contrary to this proposition, the New Jersey Superior 
       Court after Spring Motors has upheld fraud claims 
       between commercial parties, see Perth Amboy Iron 
       Works, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Company, 226 
       N.J. Super. 200, 543 A.2d 1020 (App. Div. 1988), [aff'd 
       571 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1990)]. No New Jersey court, 
       though, has explicitly considered whether these claims 
       are barred by Spring Motors. Because we determine 
       that plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support its 
       claim of fraud, making summary judgment proper , we 
       decline to wade into this morass.  
 
Vanguard Telecom. v. So. New England Tel., 900 F.2d 645, 
654 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J.). The same"morass" exists 
today. The New Jersey District Courts still hold that fraud 
claims not extrinsic to underlying contract claims are not 
maintainable as separate causes of action. See, e.g., Lo 
Bosco v. Kure Engineering Ltd., 891 F . Supp. 1020, 1033 
(D. N.J. 1995). New Jersey state courts have not agr eed 
with the District Courts' interpretation of Spring Motors. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court still has not decided the 
issue. We will avoid predicting New Jersey law by deciding 
the fraud issue on its merits, as we did in V anguard. 
 
       2. Merits 
 
Under New Jersey law, legal fraud is "a material 
misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact, made 
with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the 
other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party 
to his detriment." Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 
86 N.J. 619, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (1981). Deliberate 
suppression of a material fact that should be disclosed is 
equivalent to a material misrepresentation (i.e., an 
affirmative false statement). See Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 
43, 62, 657 A.2d 420 (1995). In other words,"[s]ilence, in 
the face of a duty to disclose, may be a fraudulent 
concealment." Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 93, 
458 A.2d 1311 (Ch. Div. 1981), aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 
458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 549, 468 
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A.2d 197 (1983). The concealed facts "must be facts which 
if known . . . would have prevented [the obligor] from 
obligating himself, or which materially incr ease his 
responsibility." Ramapo Bank v. Bechtel , 224 N.J. Super. 
191, 198, 539 A.2d 1276 (App. Div. 1988). A party has no 
duty to disclose information to another party in a business 
transaction unless a fiduciary relationship exists between 
them, unless the transaction itself is fiduciary in nature, or 
unless one party "expressly reposes a trust and confidence 
in the other." Berman, 189 N.J. Super. at 93-94, 458 A.2d 
1311. 
 
Even if Keller knowingly and intentionally lied in 
response to Gleason's inquiries about whether Boris and 
USR were for sale, this cannot be the basis of a fraud claim 
here. Because Keller and Norwest had no duty to disclose 
to Gleason negotiations with potential buyers, Keller's 
failure to disclose pending, amorphic negotiations is not 
material and, thus, not actionable.7 Furthermore, we note 
that Keller was bound at that time to remain silent during 
conversations with Gleason because of a confidentiality 
understanding between Norwest and Moore. 
 
Although Norwest may have breached the SP A by failing 
to offer Gleason the same price it offer ed to Moore for USR, 
we will not reverse and remand on the fraud claim. It may 
have been possible for Gleason to establish fraud by 
proving that Norwest intentionally misr epresented a 
material term (price), causing Gleason damage. Gleason's 
Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, however , 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Of course, we do not say that one may with impunity affirmatively tell 
material lies in the course of a business transaction because of the lack 
of an agreement to disclose information to another. Rather, we reason 
that, in this particular instance, the absence of a duty on Norwest's part 
to inform Gleason with respect to thir d-party negotiations that might 
later influence his dormant right of first refusal weakens any notion of 
"materiality." Stated differently, Gleason's fraud claim fails not because 
Norwest was permitted to lie to him, but because the parties' contractual 
relationship was such that the purported lie was immaterial to Gleason's 
eventual exercise -- or failure to exercise -- his right of first refusal. 
This 
is a subtle yet important distinction which both r einforces the law of 
Jewish Center of Sussex County while simultaneously disposing of 
Gleason's fraud claim. 
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alleges fraud concerning only the misstatements we found 
insufficient above. Therefore, summary judgment on the 




Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed in all respects except as to Counts II and V of the 
Second Amended and Supplemented Complaint. As to those 
counts, the judgment is reversed and the case r emanded to 
the District Court for fact finding on the issues discussed 
above and for such further proceedings as ar e consistent 
with this opinion. Costs taxed against the appellee. 
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